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Abstract: Environment and development issues are complex and interdependent. 
Institutions underpinning state, private sector and civil society actions at various levels 
must address complexity to ensure social-ecological system integrity. However, responses 
often operate at only one governance level, with limited interactions with other levels, 
restricting their ability to support communities who depend on natural resources for their 
livelihoods. This paper explores institutional factors influencing household entitlements to 
mangrove system provisioning goods on Vietnam’s northern coast. The environmental 
entitlements framework is used to identify: (1) current formal and informal institutional 
structures relating to mangrove systems; (2) the influence of state, private sector and  
non-governmental organisation actors at various levels; and (3) how actions occurring at 
and among various levels of governance shape mangrove system entitlements at the local 
level. Employing a case study approach, this research utilises qualitative methods and a 
multi-level governance approach to understand prevailing institutional contexts. Results 
indicate that reforms occurring within weak regulatory frameworks led to the concentration 
of power at the meso level, reducing the endowments of marginalized households. Market 
forces facilitated inequality and environmental degradation, negatively impacting 
household entitlements. Finally, a lack of formally recognised civil society constrained 
household capabilities to participate in mangrove planning. Mangrove dependent 
households must be integrated into mangrove planning at the local level, as processes at 
higher institutional levels affect household environmental entitlements and threaten 
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sustainable outcomes. Ensuring views from the local level feed into the multi-level 
governance process is vital. 
Keywords: natural resource management; coastal; wetland; sustainable development;  
multi-level governance; capabilities 
 
1. Introduction 
Mangrove systems are highly productive and deliver multiple benefits to humans [1]: sequestering 
carbon to contribute to global climate regulation [2]; significantly reducing dike maintenance and 
coastal protection costs for national governments [3]; protecting coastal localities from storms and 
erosion [4]; regulating local water quality [5]; and providing ecosystem provisioning goods such as 
fish, shrimp, crustaceans and molluscs to support the livelihoods of coastal households [6]. However, 
mangrove systems are being rapidly degraded and lost due to human activities such as urbanisation, 
industrialisation, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction [4]. The conversion of 
mangrove system areas to large-scale, intensive commercial aquaculture has been identified as a 
particularly significant threat to mangrove systems [5], undermining the livelihoods of communities 
dependent on mangrove system resources for their survival [7]. 
Human-environment interactions, including in mangrove systems, function as integrated  
social-ecological systems (SES) [8]. Governance decisions and actions interact with environmental 
processes, and are channelled through and influenced by institutions at and across various levels  
(i.e., international, national, provincial, district and local) [9]. Governance refers to “…all processes of 
governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal 
or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language” ([10] p. 1). 
It relates to “…the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a 
collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and 
institutions” ([11] p. 405). Institutions are defined by North ([12] p. 97) as “…humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions”. In an SES frame, institutions 
operate at multiple levels of SES governance [13]. Hence, governance indicates an absence of coercive 
state power in SES management and is defined as the establishment, reaffirmation or change of 
institutions to resolve conflicts over environmental resources [14]. 
As global structures and processes increase the complexity of SES governance, involving state, 
private sector, and civil society actors, with differing interests, claims and influence [15], efforts 
towards sustainable SES governance face many institutional challenges [16]. SES planning is typically 
developed and operates at the national level, failing to sufficiently recognise that such systems involve 
multiple actors operating at and between various institutional levels [17]. These institutional structures 
and processes shape how natural resource dependent communities (NRDC) are affected by and 
respond to change [18], and can undermine the ability of households in NRDC to access the resources 
that underpin their livelihoods [19]. Hence, to achieve the sustainable management of mangrove 
systems and support local livelihoods, SES planning should not focus on one particular level, but seek 
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to understand the influence of broader institutional structures and processes and the wide range of 
stakeholders that operate at different levels of governance [20]. 
Despite growing acknowledgement of the importance of multi-level institutional structures and 
processes for sustainable mangrove SES governance, how such structures and processes shape the 
differentiation of natural resource access within NRDC remains understudied [21]. There is an urgent 
need for case study research in areas faced with the interconnected challenge of increased human 
activity and degradation in order to reconcile the goals of development and conservation [22]. 
Mangrove systems therefore offer an important and timely case study focus. Vietnam provides a highly 
relevant context for this research, having undergone significant social, economic, and environmental 
change of its mangrove SES [7]. Vietnam’s transition from a highly centralised planned economy to a 
socialist-orientated market economy was initiated in 1986 (Đổi Mới). During this time, economic 
reforms were implemented while the Communist Party retained political control. Reforms included: 
devolution of land management from centralised collectives to households; decentralisation of land 
allocation decision making to local government; and market liberalisation. Although the transition has 
fostered significant economic gains, a set of intractable social and environmental issues, such as 
growing inequality and natural resource degradation and loss, remain [23]. Vietnam’s transition has 
exposed its mangrove systems to pressures from various levels, and facilitated the rapid conversion of 
mangrove system land to commercial aquaculture [24]. Vietnam has lost 69% of its 269,000 hectares 
of mangrove forests held in 1980, with an estimated 77% of this loss due to aquaculture [25]. 
Mangrove systems along the northern coastline of Vietnam help protect coastal areas from annual 
typhoons that can be very destructive and threaten lives and livelihoods. Some may bring no more than 
heavy rains and strong winds but others can cause intense flooding, severe landslides, claim thousands 
of lives and cause millions of dollars in damage. Studying the implications of Vietnam’s transition on 
the entitlements of mangrove system resource dependent communities (MRDC) from an institutional 
perspective can enhance insights into the interdependencies between human activity and mangrove 
goods and services. 
Institutional structures and processes operating at and among various levels create a range of 
fundamental economic, ecological, social and political challenges for the sustainable governance of 
mangrove systems. Such challenges affect sustainable governance at the local level by shaping access 
to the natural resources communities depend on for their livelihoods and survival. This paper aims to 
understand how institutional process and structures occurring at multiple levels of governance allow 
particular individuals and groups to access differing entitlements to mangrove system resources, using 
northern Vietnam as a case study. To do this, the paper identifies: (1) current formal and informal 
institutional structures relating to mangrove systems; (2) the influence of state, private sector and  
non-governmental organisation actors at various levels; and (3) how actions occurring at and among 
various levels of governance shape mangrove system entitlements at the local level. We argue that 
political and economic reforms implemented within a weak formal institutional framework have 
reinforced pre-existing power structures and concentrated wealth among local elites, negatively 
impacting the mangrove entitlements of marginalised households. The informal institutional setting 
within which reforms are implemented can further constrain the capability of marginalised households 
to participate in mangrove management decisions, which is necessary for sustainable governance of 
mangrove systems. 
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The next sections outline central concepts related to multi-level governance of social-ecological 
systems and environmental entitlements, followed by details of the research design and process.  
The formal and informal institutional settings relating to mangrove system governance are then 
explored, followed by the identification and role of state, private sector and civil society actors within 
governance processes, and the implications for household mangrove system entitlements. Lessons 
from such insights are then discussed, leading to the presentation of conclusions to inform future 
mangrove system governance. 
Central Concepts 
It is increasingly recognised that ecosystems may avoid degradation and loss if there is social 
capacity to respond effectively to change [13]. However, the multi-level character of SES suggests that 
state regulation and private ownership are inadequate and lack the capacity to deal with such 
complexity [20]. As awareness of the complexity and interconnectedness of SES increases, institutions 
will play a vital role in the success of governance solutions [26]. Institutions can be both formal and 
informal, “…formal institutions are openly codified, in the sense that they are established and 
communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official…informal institutions are socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” ([27] p. 727). Responses to SES dynamics are formed partly through institutions 
that shape relations among and between multiple levels of governance [28]. Institutions emanate from 
agreements and debates occurring over time and hence carry a bias from these previous negotiations, 
perceptions and power relations [29]. This process is referred to as “institutionalisation” [30]. 
Subsequently, institutions comprise a degree of resistance to change which can constrain action [31]. 
Furthermore, institutions enable and maintain the involvement of certain actors and practices, they can 
also exclude or constrain others [28]. Collaborative approaches to natural resource governance 
incorporate multiple viewpoints and resources that are leveraged through the collaborative process, 
fostering more flexible and responsive institutions and actions for managing conflicts, building trust, 
pooling resources, building capacity and sustaining action [32]. 
Polycentric governance has emerged as a collaborative approach to analyse those institutions that 
shape decision making among multiple actors, authorities, organisations and sectors at multiple scales 
of governance [33]. This is particularly important for biologically diverse systems such as mangroves, 
where human-environment interactions are little understood [34]. Polycentric systems are complex, 
adaptive, non-hierarchical systems that incorporate local and scientific knowledge, utilising the 
complementarities to overcome the limitations and weakness of the other [33]. Such collaborative 
governance arrangements (when individuals from differing groups provide inputs to produce a good or 
service [35]) have been presented as more effective, transparent and representative because citizens  
can influence governance at multiple levels of authority [36,37]. Hence, polycentric governance is a 
multi-level approach with the potential to tackle complex multi-scale challenges due to its focus on 
cross-level interactions [38]. 
Entitlements refer to the social, political and economic processes that institutionalise resource 
rights, access and distribution in ways that are often path-dependent, creating differentiated access and 
control over resources within communities [28]. Sen [39] defines entitlements as “…the set of 
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alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and 
opportunities that he or she faces” (p. 497). A person’s “entitlement set” is the full range of goods and 
services that they can acquire by converting their “endowments” (i.e., an individual’s initial ownership 
of, for example, land, capital or labour) through processes of “mapping”. Mapping describes the 
relationship between the initial endowment set and the resulting entitlement set. Such relations may be 
based on such processes as production, trade, inheritance or transfer. Entitlements, in turn, enhance 
people’s capabilities. Nussbaum [40] describes one aspect of capabilities as the ability to control one’s 
environment through effective participation in the political decisions that govern one’s life: i.e., having 
the right of political participation, and protections of free speech and association. Examining 
entitlements can provide insights into how people gain divergent entitlements from their initial 
endowments, and so improve their well-being or capabilities. Hence, institutions operating at multiple 
levels of governance shape household entitlements to natural resources [41]. 
However, entitlement approaches have been criticized for: (1) focusing on how endowments 
(assumed to be simply given) are transformed into entitlements, with limited attention to how people 
gain endowments [42]; and (2) giving priority to individuals’ command over resources through market 
channels, backed up by formal legal property rights [43]. Hence, the entitlement approach may be 
inadequate in contexts where the relationship between individuals and resources is mediated by  
non-market and/or informal institutions. Analysis is required that recognizes the importance of  
non-market institutions in determining entitlements [43]. The environmental entitlements framework 
presented by Leach et al. [42] is used here to address this challenge by considering how institutional 
structures and processes at multiple scales differentiate the command of environmental goods and 
services that are instrumental to local livelihoods within MRDC. The framework has been successfully 
used to examine: co-management in marine ecosystems of Chile [44]; gender relations regarding 
coastal natural resources in Tanzania [45]; land rights and forest resources in South Africa [46]; 
empowerment and institutions in management of fisheries in Uganda [47]; and forest devolution and 
forest resources in Vietnam [48]. 
The ability of households to access the resources necessary to support their livelihoods is shaped 
through their environmental entitlements, i.e., the ability of households to gain legitimate control, 
access and use of the ecosystem services. Environmental entitlements refer to “…alternative sets of 
utilities derived from environmental goods…over which social actors have legitimate effective 
command and which are instrumental in achieving well-being” ([42] p. 233). The environmental 
entitlements approach provides a multi-level approach for studying the role of diverse and dynamic 
institutions operating at macro, meso and micro levels of SES. Figure 1 illustrates the environmental 
entitlements framework, where an undifferentiated “environment” is disaggregated into specific 
environmental goods, and the relations between and within a given “community” is made up of 
differentiated social actors. Social actors obtain capabilities by acquiring legitimate, effective 
command over resources by gaining entitlements through processes of endowment mapping.  
The framework centres on the dynamic mapping processes that underlie each of the static endowment, 
entitlement and capability sets, which are themselves mediated by numerous types of institution 
occurring at the macro, meso and micro levels. Figure 1 deviates from the original framework 
presented by Leach et al., at this point, in that the institutions that shape endowments, entitlements and 
capabilities are not considered distinct, but rather linked phenomena that shape access to and control 
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over local resources. This reflects Ostrom’s [26] observation that: “…appropriation, provision, 
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprises” (p. 90). The relationships between and among institutional levels are a 
salient influence on which actors gain access to and control over natural resources, and whose actions 
cumulatively change and shape the landscape over time (represented by feedback loops). Hence, 
environmental entitlements is an approach for explaining how the consequences of environmental 
change in general, and access to and control over natural resources in particular, are socially 
differentiated within communities [42]. 
 
Figure 1. The Environmental Entitlements Framework (EEF). Adapted from Leach et al. [42]. 
Understanding what these interactions mean for environmental entitlements will inform mangrove 
management and institution building in order to support mangrove conservation, as well as the 
livelihoods of MRDC. In order to achieve this, this research uses an integrated and holistic approach, 
drawing on the environmental entitlements framework and applying a qualitative approach to a case 
study setting to understand the social, political, institutional and environmental aspects driving the 
institutional structures and processes of mangrove system governance. 
2. Methods 
Research Design 
Data collection was conducted between April 2011 and August 2013 in three coastal communities 
in northern Vietnam: Giao Xuan (Nam Dinh province); Da Loc (Thanh Hoa province); and Dong Rui 
(Quang Ninh province) (Figure 2). For the purpose of this study, a community is defined as a 
subsection of a commune, representing a spatially and historically distinct socio-economic impact area 
of a given mangrove system [49]. Study communities were identified following meetings, discussions 
and field visits with in-country partners, and selected based on significant mangrove presence 
contributing to local livelihoods, degree of aquaculture development, livelihood activities (i.e., rural), 
geographic location (i.e., northern coast), and climatic aspects. The three selected communities 
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represent mangrove systems that are distinct, geographically separate and with different histories. All 
study sites were characteristic of intertidal wetlands, where communities had some level of access to 
adjacent mangrove systems. Each mangrove system comprised the interdependent components of trees 
and intertidal mudflat areas from which communities acquired provisioning goods. In all three 
communities, MSPG refer to the wild fish, clams, shrimp, crab and other shoreline animals collected 
from mangrove system commons. Regarding the environmental entitlements framework, the macro level 
refers to national and international level institutions; the meso level encompasses institutions operating 
below national institutions and above households; and the micro level refers to household institutions. 
 
Figure 2. Study site locations and coordinates (source: modified from Wikipedia [50]). 
Giao Xuan has a highly developed clam aquaculture sector which was established in the early 
1990s. The sector was facilitated and supported by emerging trade connections between local 
households and aquaculture investors from China following market liberalisation (in 1986). Giao Xuan 
is now one of the largest producers of clams in Vietnam, supplying both domestic and international 
markets. Aquaculture farms are situated in the mudflat area located beyond the mangrove forest and 
covering the full extent of the coastline adjacent to the community. In Da Loc the clam aquaculture 
sector is in the initial stages of development, having been started in 2010 by local households who 
observed the success of neighbouring communities’ clam aquaculture ventures. They have little 
experience, knowledge or support but productivity is rising quickly and domestic markets are rapidly 
growing. As with Giao Xuan, the aquaculture farms are situated in the mudflat area located beyond the 
mangrove forest and cover the full extent of coastline adjacent to the community. Dong Rui is situated 
on an island archipelago. The area experienced large scale, intense and highly productive commercial 
shrimp and fish aquaculture growth during the late 1980s and early 1990s, in adjacent areas surrounding 
the community on all sides. These ventures were carried out by investors external to the local area, who 
brought their own labour force to work in the fields. Following an initial 2–3 years of high productivity, 
the sector collapsed due to mismanagement. This resulted in severe environmental damage and the 
abandonment of aquaculture fields. Considering the minor impact on community livelihood opportunities 
and social networks resulting from the establishment of aquaculture, and also the time elapsed since 
the collapse of the sector, aquaculture is considered to be at a low level in this community. 
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To assist familiarisation with the specific local contexts, histories and issues surrounding mangrove 
systems in each study site, pilot studies were conducted for 2–3 days at the start of the first visit to 
each community. These comprised transect walks through mangrove system corridors with local 
authority and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives, participant observations with 
households collecting MSPG, and informal conversations with the wider community. A qualitative 
approach was taken to data collection and analysis through a series of semi-structured interviews 
(Table 1). Household semi-structured interview respondents were selected from survey respondents in a 
wider research project [7], using purposive sampling to ensure a balance between broad categories of 
households based on wealth, gender and age [19]. Semi-structured interview questions were informed 
by pilot studies and tailored to each context, and collected data on the influence of institutional change 
on household MSPG entitlements [51]. Expert semi-structured interview respondents were selected 
using purposive sampling, with the help of in-country key informants to identify the major state, NGO 
and university stakeholders in the field of mangrove governance and research. The time span 
considered in the interviews was limited to the period 1975–2012. This covers the post-reunification 
period, encapsulating the collectivised farming era and subsequent market liberalisation, devolution of 
land management, and decentralisation of land allocation decisions: significant events in setting the 
boundaries of household access to mangrove systems. The “positioning” of the researcher and 
translator in cross-cultural research can influence how interviews and data evolve. The research also 
required translation of questions from English-Vietnamese and of responses from Vietnamese-English. 
As such, interview schedules were formulated with input of in-country colleagues in a way that was 
familiar to the interviewees [52] to develop a predefined protocol to guide discussion [53] and 
translators with experience in environment and development issues were employed [54,55]. 
Table 1. Break-down of semi-structured interviews conducted. 
Actor Giao Xuan Da Loc Dong Rui National International Total 
Donor - - - - 2 2 
NGO 1 1 1 1 2 6 
State 4 3 4 3 - 14 
University - - - 2 - 2 
Household 10 10 10 - - 30 
Total 15 14 15 6 4 54 
To identify formal and informal institutions (objective one), internet searches and secondary data 
from international NGOs and donors, the state, national NGOs, and academic respondents were used to 
purposefully select key formal institutions (openly codified, established and communicated through 
official channels). These included organisations, policies, regulations, reports and documents relating 
to mangrove system endowments (forests, wetlands, and fisheries). To assess awareness of the 
integrated nature of mangrove SES within these formal institutional structures, key official documents 
and organisations were examined through processes of thematic analysis [56] to understand the 
coherence and interaction of formal arrangements, as embedded within policy documents and 
institutional structures [57]. Informal institutions were first identified through literature searches and 
by examining instances in which similar formal rules produced divergent outcomes, and where stable 
patterns of behaviour did not correspond with formal rules [12]. This was achieved by: determining 
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interview respondents’ shared expectations and mutual understandings of formal rules; defining the 
socio-economic impact area of mangrove systems; and ascertaining how informal rules are enforced 
and managed, such as through gossip, ostracism, hostility or other displays of social disapproval [27]. 
Extensive time spent in each study site between April 2011 and August 2013 facilitated understanding 
of the wider context within which informal institutions operate. 
To achieve objective two, semi-structured interviews with all respondents were used to identify how 
key state, private sector and civil society actors have influenced household entitlements and 
entitlement mapping related to MSPGs. Expert interviews with state, private sector, civil society and 
university stakeholders sought to elucidate the changing roles and influences in the management of 
mangrove systems since the implementation of devolution, decentralisation and market reforms. 
Household interviews then sought to reveal how the changes identified in expert interviews have 
impacted households’ abilities to convert household endowments into MSPG entitlements. To achieve 
objective three, semi-structured interviews with households and stakeholders were used to ascertain 
how formal structures, informal arrangements, and key actors, had affected household MSPG 
entitlements. Interviews with state, private, NGO and university respondents sought to ascertain how 
formal and informal structures had influenced the ability of actors external to the state to influence 
policy and regulation decisions relating to mangrove systems since economic reform. Interviews with 
households sought to understand changes in how state, private sector and civil society actors and 
informal structures had affected their ability to influence and/or participate in decisions relating to MSPGs. 
Analysis of data was iterative, initially involving descriptive analysis to log trends and patterns in 
preliminary data collected during pilot studies in each commune. More detailed analysis was 
conducted as data accumulated. Interviews were coded under themes relating to endowments, 
entitlements and capabilities [58,59]. Themes were sub-categorised according to the influence of state, 
private sector and civil society actors, and informal institutions, in determining household access to 
MSPG. This facilitated identification of changes that had played a major role in household access to 
MSPG. Any conflicts or contradictions occurring in the data were either resolved by validation with 
data collected from respondents across household categories and stakeholder groups, or were explored 
further to ascertain whether conflict or consensus was observed. This resulted in a cyclical process 
culminating in inductive interpretation and explanation of results as institutional data was positioned 
within the developing picture of the socio-economic, political and environmental context. 
3. Results 
3.1. Formal and Informal Institutional Arrangements Relating to Mangrove SES Governance 
This section identifies the current formal and informal institutional mechanisms across and within 
levels that shape mangrove SES governance and household MSPG entitlements. 
3.1.1. Formal Institutions 
Differences in mangrove system endowments derive largely from variations in statutory rights [60] 
and land use regulations [61]. In Vietnam, the same laws and regulations that govern terrestrial forests 
apply to mangrove forests, with the primary statutory laws underpinning the rights and duties for 
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mangrove forest stakeholders being: the Land Law 1993; the Forest Use and Development Law 
(FPDL) 2004; and the Grassroots Democracy Decree 1998. 
Forest Policy 
Until the mid-1980s, forestry policy was characterized by centralized State control and forests were 
deemed national assets owned by the State. State Forest Enterprises (SFE) and other State 
organizations were in control of 70% of forest land [62]. However, corruption in the forestry sector, a 
lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of legislation and policies, and a lack of incentives for 
local people to conserve and sustainably manage forest resources stemmed from the institutional 
problems associated with centralised state ownership [63]. Thus, state ownership of forest resources 
led to de jure state property but de facto open-access [64], and poor management of forests by SFE 
resulted in severe forest degradation and loss [65]. This was disastrous for the millions of people 
dependent on forest products for their livelihoods [66]. Local people’s interest and insights were not 
taken into account in forest management, and an inadequate policy framework led to confusion among 
actors regarding forest endowments and conflicts between local resource users and state forest 
organizations, such as state-owned forestry companies and forest rangers [63,66]. The unequal 
distribution of land endowments emanated from the appropriation of land by farmers, causing intense 
conflict over forest rights and boundaries among divergent actors [63]. 
The 1986 “Đổi Mới” economic reforms led to the development of the “Socialist-oriented market 
economy”, bringing to an end the push for collectivisation and the exclusive commune cooperatives on 
agriculture and forestry [67]. After the initial success of “Đổi Mới”, the legal framework of land tenure 
changed further, devolving from State-based to society based management. Devolution aimed to 
address institutional problems, which were identified as the major reason behind forest loss and 
degradation [68], by increasing the power of local people by way of legal acts [69] and institutional 
changes [70]. In 1991, supported by the IUCN and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
the government released an important report highlighting forest loss and degradation. The report 
argued that “the most important issue in Vietnam is protection” ([71] p. 91), and that “without effective 
support from external sources Vietnam will not be able to maintain a sufficient base for the threatened 
species or its natural habitat”. 
The Vietnamese government also passed the Law on Forest Development and Protection in 1991, 
under which it shifted focus from forest production to forest conservation, with positive consequences 
for household mangrove SES endowments. Under the 1991 Law on Forest Development and 
Protection, forests are classified into three categories: special-use; protection; and production. Special 
Use Forest is primarily used for preserving the natural form of national forest ecosystems; protecting 
ecosystems, plant and animal diversity, and preserving historic, cultural and scenic sites. Protection 
forest is primarily used for watershed and environmental protection, and to protect against damage by 
wave, wind and sand. These two categories are under control of State Management Boards. The third 
category of forest: production forest, is mainly used as a source of wood and other forest products, 
which are under the management of the SFE. This forest category can be exploited for commercial 
purposes and to contribute to socio-economic development [63]. Production forests are allocated by 
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central government and managed by SFEs (now called forestry companies) who are legislatively 
responsible for the socio-economic development activities in and around the forests. 
The 1991 Forestry Law defines the legal opportunities for forest land allocation and the leasing of 
forests (i.e., endowment) to individuals, households, management boards, economic organizations and 
communities. However, when forest land is allocated to communities, they “…are not allowed to 
divide forests among their members and cannot convert, transfer, donate, lease, mortgage, provide 
guarantee or contribute business capital with, the value of the use rights over assigned forests”  
(Art. 30(2)(e), Law No. 29/2004) [72]. Protection and less-restricted production forest can also be 
allocated to households and individuals for long-term use. When forest is allocated to households, they 
receive a “red book” forest land use title for up to 50 years, with a bundle of rights consisting of rights 
of use, transfer, lease, inheritance and mortgage [73]. The Law reflects the state policy of: investing in, 
encouraging and supporting forest protection and development; and expanding the market for forestry 
products and insuring plantation forest [74]. 
In 1993 the Vietnamese government strengthened the special-use forest system to meet obligations 
under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the Ramsar Convention 
by increasing the total surface area of protected areas to two million hectares [75]. Under the UNCBD, 
a fundamental principle of the programme of work for Article 8(j) [76] has been the participation of 
local communities in the work of the Convention. The government signed the UNCBD in 1995 and 
implemented the National Biodiversity Conservation Strategies in 1999. Forestry sectors have 
integrated conservation and sustainable use int o national laws, policies, and programs and the national 
strategy. The National Target Program for Forestry (NTPF) (1998–2010), also known as the 5 Million 
Hectare Reforestation Program 661, aimed to conserve biodiversity, eradicate hunger, eliminate 
poverty and develop the national economy. However, the area of mangrove forest declined during this 
period from approximately 233,000 ha to 140,000 ha [77]. The remaining mangrove forests were 
allocated as: 13% special use; 55% protection; and 31% production. Mangrove forests are 
predominantly held by four major stakeholders: management boards (51%), commune People’s 
Committees (29%), private companies (10%), and households and communities (10%). Hence, 
mangrove forest tenure is largely vested in the State, through special-use and protection forests that are 
primarily governed by management boards and Commune People’s Committees (CPC). Mangrove 
system areas in all three study sites were either under the control of CPC, whom subsequently 
allocated much of the area to households. Nevertheless, in recognition of the limited capacity of the 
state to carry out all mangrove management duties, the national government increasingly recognises 
the opportunities that NGOs and others outside the state administration provide. The government seeks 
to promote and attract foreign financial and technical support from donor agencies and Western 
conservation organisations for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, in order to meet its 
obligations under the convention [78]. Following the NTPF, the Prime Minister approved a 10-year 
forest protection and development plan for 2011–2020, including plantation and development of 
100,000 ha of coastal protection forest. A number of mangrove development programmes that link to 
the UNCBD are listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. National programs/strategies on mangrove forests related to UNCBD. 
National 
Programme/Strategy 
Objectives 
National 
Biodiversity 
Strategy to 2020, 
vision to 2030 
 Integrated biodiversity conservation into national, sectoral and provincial 
development strategies, plans and policies. 
 Sustainable use, fair and equitable access, and sharing of benefits derived from 
ecosystems and biodiversity, involving community participation. 
 Control activities that have a negative impact on biodiversity, such as: 
unsustainable use; forest conversion; pollution; and include broad participation 
of communities and mass media to prevent and detect illegal exploitation. 
 Change in behaviour and awareness of state management organisations and 
communities towards biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. 
 Increase of financial resources for biodiversity conservation by encourage and 
mobilize community participation. 
 Promote integration and international cooperation in conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. 
 Actively participate in and effectively implement international treaties related to 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
 Promote and attract foreign resources for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity. 
 Strengthen learning and exchange of resources and experiences with other 
countries and international organisations. 
National 
Programme to 
Restore and Develop 
Coastal Mangrove 
Forest for the Period 
2008–2015 
 Protection of the existing 210,000 ha area of mangrove forest, to bring the total 
coastal mangrove area to 300,000 ha by 2015. 
 Prioritization of afforestation and protection of 500 m wide mangrove belts in 
front of sea dykes. 
 Development of models for mangrove rehabilitation, development  
and protection. 
 Development of protected mangrove areas and improvement of national 
planning and policies and mechanisms on coastal mangrove rehabilitation  
and development. 
 Development of a national database system for coastal mangrove management. 
 Help implement national target programmes on climate change response 
through donor-funded projects on mangrove conservation and rehabilitation. 
The Vietnam 
National Strategy 
for Forestry 
Development  
2006–2020 
 Protect forests and conserve biodiversity in an effective manner with active 
participation of local community people and enhance the contribution of 
environmental services from forests. Benefits from forest utilization and 
harvesting should be available for forest owners and communities participating 
in forest protection management, while negative environmental impacts of 
harvesting and use of forest should be limited. The state encourages 
organizations, households, individuals and local communities to invest, manage, 
harvest and use forests sustainably. 
Resources 2015, 4 915 
 
 
Table 2. Cont. 
National 
Programme/Strategy 
Objectives 
The Vietnam 
National Strategy 
for Forestry 
Development  
2006–2020 
 Renovate forest sector institutions, policy, planning and monitoring: Create a 
favourable legal environment for forestry activities according to the market 
orientation and international integration, with a broad participation of 
households, communities and private sector. Strengthen the organizational 
system while planning work and monitoring in the forestry sector  
are renovated. 
 Ensure active participation of different economic partners and social 
organizations in forestry development in order to maximize contributions to 
socio-economic development, environment protection, biodiversity 
conservation, provision of environmental services, hunger eradication, 
poverty elimination, livelihood improvement, and ensuring national security. 
National Action Plan 
for Protection and 
Development of 
Vietnam’s 
Mangrove Forests 
2005–2015 
 Promote the protection, rehabilitation and wise use of Vietnam’s mangrove 
ecosystem towards sustainable development so that the protection function, 
values and its biodiversity meet the need of socio-economic development 
and environmental protection in river estuaries and coastal areas. 
 Change the perception on mangrove ecosystem values for key managers at 
local (province and district) levels, mass organizations and communities in 
mangrove areas. 
 Reinforce the effectiveness of mangrove ecosystem protection, rehabilitation 
and development. 
 Establish and complete a legal framework for mangrove ecosystem 
management and encourage community-based mangrove management. 
 Improve perception and understandings on biodiversity of mangrove 
ecosystem, and conservation values of rare and precious gene sources. 
 Contribute to livelihood improvement for the people who live inside or in 
the vicinity of mangrove areas. 
Wetland Policy 
A comprehensive and effective legal framework for wetlands does not exist in Vietnam. Wetland 
management is addressed indirectly through various laws and regulations relating to environmental 
protection, agriculture, forestry and aquaculture policies [79]. The constitution of Vietnam establishes 
public ownership of lands, forests, rivers, lakes, waterheads and underground resources. In 1993 the 
Land Law was introduced which states that land is the property of the Vietnamese people, with the 
State as representative owner (Land Law, 2003: Article 5, Clause 1). The Land Law clearly states that 
land is planned and generally managed by the state, but can be allocated to individuals, households, 
social organizations and communities for long-term use in compliance with agreed purposes. This had 
a positive impact on people’s land endowments, with lease holders also able to exchange, transfer or 
inherit land use rights, or use the land as collateral for bank loans [74]. However, whilst the Vietnam 
Civil Code (2005) provides for common ownership of land rights by communities, it does not 
recognise communities as legal entities. As such, communities cannot enter into economic transactions 
such as leasing and transferring their rights. Although there is formal recognition of the right of 
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communities to be granted land-use rights at the macro level, this is rarely the case in practice at the 
micro level. The Land Law affirms the need for environmental protection and the need to implement 
measures for land protection, enhanced sedimentation, and ecological protection. The Land Law uses 
the term “lands with waterbodies” to describe wetlands. However, the Land Law does not establish a 
separate framework for wetland management or specify the precise meaning of “lands with 
waterbodies”, but includes wetlands as part of other specified lands (agriculture, forest). 
Wetland management issues are also referred to in sections of the Land Law relating to the 
protection and exploitation of aquatic resources. Wetlands here are defined as “lands with waterbodies 
for aquaculture and aquatic resource exploitation”. Regulations encourage economic exploitation of 
wetland resources and do not include a clear policy to address their conservation. The National 
Aquaculture Development Programme (1999) greatly influenced the rapid spread of aquaculture. This 
was facilitated through two central policies that: granted households the right to convert low-
productivity and uncultivated land to aquaculture use; and provided financial support to poor farmers 
without collateral. Hence, wetlands have been exploited to increase food production without adequate 
recognition of their crucially important ecological functions. However, wetland issues have been 
covered under legislation on the protection and exploitation of aquatic resources and the prevention of 
damage to aquatic resources and pollution of habitats [79]. Nevertheless, government agencies are not 
fully aware of the special features of wetlands and instead, these agencies continue to apply a sectoral 
style of management, focussing on land use to exploit wetland resources. Although Vietnam signed the 
Ramsar Convention in 1989, international assistance on wetland resource conservation has only 
contributed to better understanding of the characteristics and consequences of environmental change in 
the five areas of Vietnam designated as Ramsar sites. A comprehensive framework for wetland 
management would provide a legal basis for specific regulations on wetland management and use. 
Mangrove System Jurisdiction 
Figure 3 illustrates the formal arrangements across levels in specific relation to mangrove system 
management. At the meso level, Province People’s Committees (PPC) implement and enforce the 
Land Law and evaluate and approve plans of organisations to convert land to other uses (agriculture, 
aquaculture or other productive uses). District People’s Committees (DPC) evaluate and approve 
household and individual plans. Plans for conversion to agriculture or aquaculture must comply with 
the applicable land use master plan and an environmental impact assessment must be completed. 
Commune People’s Committees (CPC) (the lowest level of state administration) exercise state 
authority over land and are temporary custodians of unallocated land. Management of trees on special 
use and protection forestry land is the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) (Table 3). Although there are MARD branch offices at provincial (PARD) and district 
(DARD) levels, there is no department with a particular focus on mangroves. The district staff of 
MARD’s Department of Forest Protection usually support CPCs to manage mangrove forests. The 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) is responsible for special use and protection 
forestry land management (including wetlands), and they also have branch offices at the provincial 
(PoNRE) and district (DoNRE) level responsible for local land management and supporting CPCs at 
each level. 
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Figure 3. Formal structures for forest management in Vietnam. Adapted from: Hawkins et al. [80]. 
Table 3 Responsibilities of key ministries in mangrove governance. 
MARD (Forest/Fisheries) MoNRE (Land/Water) 
Forest use planning  
Forest protection and development  
Forest boundary demarcation  
Forest allocation and leasing  
Forest conversion  
Aquaculture and fisheries management 
Land use planning  
Surveys and mapping  
Land allocation  
Land registration  
Issuance of land use certificates  
Geology and mining  
Water management 
The Land Law and Forest Protection and Development Law each state that MARD and MoNRE 
must coordinate their activities with one another in managing lands and forests [80]. Coordination is 
important, for example, for MoNRE to issue appropriate and accurate land use certificates. The 
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certificate should reflect the quality, type, and extent of any forest on the land, information that can 
only be obtained from MARD. If the ministries fail to coordinate, land use certificates for forest land 
will be incomplete and inaccurate. Yet, in practice, coordination between MARD and MoNRE at all 
levels is often very weak. Weak management capacity, oversight and poor coordination among 
relevant sectors, insufficient funding, and deficient institutional and legal frameworks have resulted in 
ineffective mangrove system management. The unclear and confused division of jurisdiction and weak 
collaboration between these two ministries creates confusion for stakeholders and uncertainty in 
mangrove management [81]. In addition, while People’s Committees have clear jurisdiction, they may 
lack the resources or specialized expertise to exercise effective mangrove management [80]. 
The Grassroots Democracy Decree 
During the 1990s, socio-political disorder exacerbated by the shortcomings of local authorities 
increased the awareness of the government to concerns about people’s political rights, especially in 
rural areas, and of the risks of spontaneous resistance by those not in favour of the socio-political 
stabilization of the country [82]. An important development in civil cooperation, which affected 
household capabilities to access MSPGs, was the Grassroots Democracy Decree (1998). This gives the 
right to the population to be informed and carry out, discuss and monitor decisions relevant to them. 
The aim of the decree was to increase the participation of people in decisions about a majority of the 
important socio-economic activities in their localities, according to the principle of “people know, 
people discuss, people do and people check”, in addition to the indirect democratic system through the 
National Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels. MARD advised local authorities to develop 
village conventions for forest protection together with local residents, and provide timely information 
to the people on important plans and activities that will be carried out in their localities, such as state 
policies, new laws, the long-term and annual development plans of local authorities, budget predictions 
and actual expenditure by communes, as well as resolutions and plans relating to loans for the 
development of production, the results of inspections and checks on negative actions by state cadres, 
and so on [82]. 
In addition to the Communist Party, a special character of the political structure in Vietnam is the 
legal acceptance of participation in management activities by certain socio-political organizations. 
Many localities set up steering committees to exercise democratic rights with the participation of 
Communist Party members, state officials and inspection committees, as well as social organizations 
such as the Fatherland Front, encompassing Mass Organisations such as farmer, women, veteran, and 
youth unions and associations [82]. These efforts have seen varying degrees of success. At the meso 
level, Mass Organisations are government sponsored bodies, described in Vietnam’s constitution as 
“the political base of people’s power” mandated with promoting “national solidarity” and “unity of 
mind in political and spiritual matters”. Hence, Mass Organisations are linked to the Communist Party 
at the macro level while also playing a semi-independent role at the meso level. Regarding forest 
governance, their key role is raising awareness of national policy and state intentions, and also 
mobilising local villagers and communities for protection and management of forests at the meso level. 
Membership of Mass Organisations is the largest of any organisation in Vietnam (membership is often 
mandatory with public sector employment), and State and NGO mangrove projects are largely 
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implemented through them. Mass Organisations are largely government funded, and are accountable 
primarily to the state, not their members or other citizens. Mass Organisations hold democratic 
elections, but elected leaders must be approved (or even pre-approved) by higher levels of government. 
3.1.2. Informal Institutions 
Although no informal institutions could be identified that directly relate to the use of MSPG, 
analysis of broader informal institutions provides the implementation context of formal institutions, 
providing crucial insights into the implications for their implantation into mangrove SES governance. 
Two logically opposed but functionally complementary principles and values are identified in 
Vietnamese society [83]. The first, yang, is influenced by Confucianism and comprises strict rules of 
behaviour based on social roles, participation in public life within a rigid hierarchy, and (male) 
dominance, all of which are relevant to a household’s capability to influence the political decisions that 
govern one’s life. This principle sees the world/universe as hierarchical, which should be reflected in 
society and people’s relationships with one another. People should conform to the rules regardless of 
circumstance, individual preference, and consequence, or face inevitable misfortune. In line with yang, 
in the three study communities the rules for mangrove system use were formulated and enforced 
through formal governance structures. Open criticism by individuals of formal management structures 
was not common in any of the communities. The second principle, yin, is influenced by Buddhism and 
promotes notions of egalitarianism, flexibility, female participation, empathy and spontaneity. 
Mediation and passivity are favoured when it comes to public affairs, with participation often 
denigrated as a “…futile struggle to impose one’s will upon a reality that is indifferent to it” ([83] p. 21). 
Nevertheless, a rich informal sector has developed in each study community which is more in line with 
the second principle of yin; designed to circumnavigate unsuitable top-down structures through 
customary codes that are more flexible, dynamic and sensitive to change. These include pooling of 
resources, work sharing, labour exchanges and other forms of non-financial support. 
In the three study communities informal rules were principally influenced by the family unit,  
which largely determines sanctions, taboos, traditions, and codes of conduct. Family is the 
fundamental unit of social organisation. Membership and position in the family is the primary element 
in personal and social identity [84]. Respect for elders, obligation to parents, and benevolence, 
obedience, and loyalty guide the behaviours and attitudes of individuals within families. Nguyen [84] 
notes that individual interests are typically surrendered for the interest of the family, and relationships 
of mutual dependence and obligation within the family are prized. This often conflicts with a public 
servant’s obligation to wider society, with family obligations often deemed greater than those to the 
public, and shame may even be directed to those that favour the latter [83]. The Vietnamese proverb 
“If a man becomes a mandarin, his whole lineage can ask favours of him” reflects the notion that those 
serving in the public realm will breach legalities in order to advance family interests. 
Vietnamese families are patriarchal [84]. As well as performing most of the domestic duties, 
women also worked long hours on aquaculture farms as waged labourers, collecting MSPG, tending to 
the household farm or working as labourers on construction sites. Although the crucial role of women 
within the household was recognised and highly regarded among most households in the study 
communities, they were often observed and described to be subordinate to men. Observations were 
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consistent with Jamieson [83] who suggests that women are frequently expected to be submissive, 
supportive and compliant towards their fathers when young; their husbands when married; and their 
sons when old. Despite formal recognition of the right of women to acquire land-use rights at the 
macro level, due to informal patriarchal customary norms, it is rarely the case in practice at the micro 
level. These entrenched customary norms constrain women’s access to land [85]. Although Vietnam’s 
Land Law states gender equality regarding access to property and land rights, in practice, women are 
allocated less land and often not included on land-use right certificates. These certificates are required 
for formal state recognition of use rights, secure tenure, formal land transactions, access to formal 
credit and for the legal protection of land-use rights [86]. Subsequently, the land endowments of 
women are greatly reduced. 
The nuclear family is embedded within the extended family, which includes the deceased and not 
yet born. Rambo [87] states that there are strong obligations to repay ancestors for the gift of life which 
is deemed a determining component of virtue and achievement, as ancestors accumulate (spiritual) 
merit through their efforts and sacrifices to ensure family heritage. Most households engaged in 
veneration and offerings to deceased family members. Jamieson [83] writes that any success 
experienced by individuals increases their obligation to give thanks, and in all households small 
shrines were apparent, with photos, incense and food offerings to ancestors. In all three communities, 
temples were present in the grounds of many wealthy households, which were often larger and more 
elaborate than living quarters, to signify success, wealth, and virtue in veneration to their ancestors. 
The literature suggests three overarching worldviews of nature in Vietnam [88], which were 
confirmed during dialogue with interviewees. The first implies that people should maintain balance 
and live in harmony with nature [89]. Interviews with households indicated that the spirits of ancestors 
are often believed to reside in nature, and should be honoured in rituals and offerings in order to 
maintain harmony between the elements, ancestors and people. Beliefs are highly superstitious and 
failure to comply is believed to invoke bad luck. The second sees nature as a resource to be exploited 
for the benefit of society [90]. Interviews with government officials suggested that they regard the 
environment as a resource to foster the economic growth of Vietnam, and that the environment will 
heal itself once a satisfactory standard of living has been achieved. Finally, nature is viewed as a threat 
to human survival, in the form of floods, typhoons, droughts and other natural hazards [91]. Interviews 
in all three communities indicated that deep sea fishing was not practiced as it was perceived as 
“…dangerous…” and “…people have died…” (Male interviewee, Giao Xuan, June 2012). This places 
greater pressure on intertidal areas to provide food for subsistence and income. 
3.2. The Role of State, Private Sector and Civil Society Actors at the Macro and Meso Level in 
Mangrove SES Governance 
State, private sector and civil society actors are central to mangrove SES governance, providing the 
links between institutional levels that shape household endowments, entitlements and capabilities.  
This section focuses on objective two, using the environmental entitlements framework to identify how 
these actors have modified and shaped mangrove SES governance structures at macro and meso levels. 
Resources 2015, 4 921 
 
 
3.2.1. Macro Level Institutional Actors 
Since economic reform (in 1986), the central State’s main concern is achieving economic growth. 
Corresponding with the worldview that depicts the environment as a resource, economic growth is 
fuelled by extraction-based export industries, with (often illegal) river and ocean bed sand mining 
posing a particular threat to mangrove systems. Vietnam’s MSPG were opened to domestic and 
international markets, most notably China. This rapidly increased the price of MSPG, and combined 
with the devolution of land management, resulted in rapid growth of the aquaculture industry. 
In light of the 2004 tsunami and increasing intensity of typhoons in the region, and worldviews that 
consider the environment as a threat to human survival, there has been growing recognition of the 
benefits mangrove forests provide: 
“More mangroves mean that provincial governments need less money from us for storm 
damage and dike maintenance.” (Male interviewee, National government, August 2012) 
Recognising their lack of capacity to undertake large scale mangrove rehabilitation, the government 
has increasingly accepted external support, acknowledging the benefit international NGOs offer 
through their global experience working in coastal areas. Vietnam has recently been the target of 
numerous mangrove afforestation projects. This has been facilitated by increasingly open international 
relations following economic reforms at the macro level, allowing international development agencies, 
both governmental and non-governmental, to provide the necessary finance and capacity to Vietnam’s 
government to undertake substantial replanting initiatives. International NGOs must clearly 
demonstrate how their work will align with government policies in order to be granted permission to 
work in Vietnam. Although this has created opportunities for new relationships to be forged between 
various stakeholders, relationships are still in line with the informal institution of not speaking out in 
public on formal issues. However, these novel arrangements present some complications: 
“Ministries work under the state so they are not often critical. INGOs can be more 
outspoken than Vietnamese, it’s the culture. But Vietnamese NGOs have the cultural 
understanding to be able to challenge the state without them being too offended because 
they are not outsiders pointing the finger, it can be received more favourably. It’s 
complicated…you need to find a balance.” (Female interviewee, international donor, 
September 2012) 
The signing of numerous international economic and environmental agreements (such as accession 
to the World Trade Organisation, and the UNCBD and Ramsar convention) in order to foster financial 
support from international donors has also led to a plethora of conflicting rules and regulations. 
Furthermore, national policy and regulations have failed to keep pace with the rapidly growing 
aquaculture industry. Insufficient coordination and increased competition for limited funds between 
and within administrative levels of MARD and MoNRE have compounded an already weak regulatory 
framework, with concern that mangrove areas are subject to the same regulatory framework and 
categorisation as terrestrial forests: 
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“Mangroves are highly sensitive and need unique conditions in order to grow. They have 
different uses for different groups and face different challenges than terrestrial forests.” 
(Male interviewee, international donor, August 2012) 
Despite the significant rise of mangrove conservation in terms of policy attention, substantive 
change has been negligible. This is reflective of the yang principle of Vietnamese society: 
“There is still too much emphasis on top-down management in Vietnam. Although there is 
lots of talk of bottom-up management, most officials are unfamiliar with these concepts so 
there is little change on the ground.” (Male interviewee, University institute, August 2012) 
3.2.2. Meso Level Actors 
Achieving short-term national economic targets remains the priority of local authorities. Devolution 
of land use and decentralisation of land allocation within weak policy and regulatory frameworks, 
combined with market liberalisation, has meant that many provinces are able to generate income 
surpluses, largely through MSPG exploitation, concurrent with the “natural environment as resource” 
world view. Consequently, some local authorities may contribute significantly to the national budget  
and no longer require provincial or central State support. This is particularly so in areas with successful 
aquaculture farming sectors and can reinforce the local authority’s ability to overrule decisions made at 
higher levels. 
In the early 1990s aquaculture was established on the intertidal mudflat areas in Giao Xuan. This 
was largely due to strong trade links with China that facilitated access to the necessary networks and 
skills to exploit the lucrative clam market. In Da Loc the clam aquaculture industry took longer to 
establish, developing during the late 2000s as locals observed the financial benefits gained by 
neighbouring provinces. Local households in both Giao Xuan and Da Loc were encouraged to take 
loans to develop aquaculture farms. In Dong Rui, the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) saw the extensive 
mangrove area previously settled by ethnic Chinese groups resettled by ethic “kinh” Vietnamese from 
nearby Hai Phong city. Huge swathes of mangrove land were allocated to shrimp aquaculture investors 
from Hai Phong city and surrounding coastal provinces, who had connections to the newly appointed 
local authorities. 
When local authorities observed the financial potential of aquaculture, large areas were allocated for 
aquaculture development: 
“The district came when they saw they could make money from auctioning land and 
imposing taxes. You can have as much land as you want, as long as you have the money or 
you are well connected.” (Male interviewee, Giao Xuan, June 2012) 
Hence, having connections to local authorities and the necessary finance enabled better off 
households to acquire sections of wetland for aquaculture development, and marginalised households 
lacking these resources. Furthermore, restrictions on the amount of land any individual could acquire 
led local officials to use the names of family and friends or pseudonyms to sign contracts for large 
scale investors. 
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At the same time local authorities recognised the benefits that mangroves provide, and encouraged 
NGO-led mangrove projects in their jurisdiction. However, with land scarce for mangrove projects, 
households complained that land would often be annexed for projects with little compensation given: 
“The government took my land and sold it to the foreigners to plant trees. They don’t care 
about the trees as long as they get the money for the projects.” (Male interviewee,  
Giao Xuan, June 2012) 
In addition, concerns were also expressed that when projects finish the land will be reallocated and 
converted back to aquaculture. 
Interviews with national university representatives suggested that in many cases local authorities 
lack understanding of new concepts introduced by international NGOs relating to mangrove 
management, such as co-management or community-based management. As such, local authorities 
often only agree to short-term commitments, needing to see the benefits of projects (usually economic) 
before longer-term commitment is considered. Interviews with international donors suggest that this 
has led to a multitude of pilot projects: 
“…the government have piloted numerous community-based projects, which keeps the 
international donors happy, while nothing substantive actually happens on the ground, 
keeping local authorities happy. We need to see real change and long-term commitments 
that recognise the rights of communities to manage forests.” (Male interviewee, 
international donor, September 2012) 
Interviews with Vietnamese NGOs and International NGOs revealed that their definition of 
“community-based projects” entails working with the local authorities, Unions and village heads  
through formal institutional structures. However, households frequently perceived these institutions as 
illegitimate, suggesting that they are formed through cliques of family and friends of local elites. 
Hence, NGO projects were often channelled through networks that marginalise certain households 
lacking connections to local elites. Nevertheless, it was recognised that NGOs must manage their 
relationships with local authorities carefully, otherwise they risk compromising their ability to work in 
the locality. 
3.3. Micro Level MSPG Entitlements 
This section addresses objective three and situates household MSPG entitlements within the 
prevailing governance structures and processes occurring at the macro and meso levels. 
In Giao Xuan and Da Loc, land reform permitted some households to acquire mangrove system 
land, while economic reform facilitated some households’ access to domestic and international 
markets, networks, and knowledge. Many exploited these opportunities, combining social, human, and 
financial endowments to develop successful aquaculture farms and increase their entitlements to 
MSPG, while households lacking these resources became increasingly marginalised. Although most 
ventures were highly productive in the initial 2–3 years, productivity fell significantly due to lack of 
environmental planning. While some aquaculture farmers were able to draw on financial and human 
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capital to sustain their aquaculture farms, many struggled and often resorted to selling farm assets 
causing endowment loss and increased marginalisation: 
“I got a bank loan to set up an aquaculture farm, but I didn’t know anything about 
aquaculture. When all the animals died I couldn’t make money. I got more bank loans to 
pay my debts hoping that the animals would return…but they never did. I had to sell 
everything at a cheap price and now life is a struggle.” (Male interviewee, Da Loc,  
August 2012) 
In Dong Rui, only a very small number of households closely connected to the local authorities 
benefitted from political or economic reform as the majority of mangrove system land was allocated to 
external aquaculture investors. Most households expressed the feeling of increased marginalisation and 
the negative environmental impacts of a rapidly growing aquaculture industry: 
“They came and used big machinery and strong chemicals to prepare the land for 
aquaculture…the water turned dirty and polluted.” (Male interviewee, Dong Rui, July 2012) 
In all three communities, mangrove commons drastically reduced compared to the pre-reform era 
due to the growing aquaculture industry, with more MSPG dependent households facing increased 
marginalisation and dangers through this endowment loss: 
“Now we have to go by boat to find the animals and it is very dangerous. Two years ago 
four women were on a boat and a strong wind sank the boat and they all died. One man 
will always go to steer the boat now, meaning we spend less time doing work at home.”  
(Male interviewee, Dong Rui, July 2012) 
Increased prices for intertidal seafood have also incentivised MSPG collection for sale, increasing 
pressure on the reduced common areas, with MSPG often being harvested before they are old enough 
to reproduce. The combined effect of environmental impacts caused by aquaculture, and increased 
pressure on greatly reduced common areas for MSPG, has contributed to the reduced quantity and 
quality of MSPGs. This is having a negative impact on those households most dependent on MSPG for 
their livelihoods, increasing their marginalisation through reduced productivity of mangrove systems 
that provide MSPG. 
Household interviews revealed that land given by local authorities for mangrove planting projects 
had also reduced the amount of common land for MSPG, causing further marginalisation and 
endowment loss to households highly dependent on MSPG. Local residents are usually prohibited 
from entering newly planted areas during the initial sensitive years of tree development and then find it 
difficult to collect MSPG in more densely forested mature mangroves. Households stated that projects 
were typically imposed in a top-down manner with little community input. Concerns were expressed 
that large international NGO projects allowed various levels of state administration to further capture 
the benefits of projects. When funds have filtered down through all the levels of government, there is 
little money left to pay households participating in mangrove projects at the micro level, resulting in 
negative entitlement changes through transfer failures: 
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“We know that the foreigners give the government lots of money to plant trees, but the 
Commune, village and Union leaders take most of the money themselves and don’t leave 
much for us. We get some money, but not as much as I could make collecting crabs.”  
(Female interviewee, Dong Rui, July 2012) 
In addition, projects relating to coastal livelihoods in Giao Xuan, which aim to reduce pressure on 
mangrove systems through alternative livelihoods (e.g., bee-keeping, mushroom growing, eco-tourism), 
are little known among more marginalised households. Those households with awareness stated that 
these projects fail to target the poorest or most dependent on MSPG, and are often appropriated by 
family and friends of local authorities. This results in negative MSPG entitlement changes for the most 
mangrove dependent households through transfer failures. 
Households frequently attributed wetland degradation to the conduct of local authorities, making 
them reluctant to be involved in mangrove projects: 
“…I have never been asked for my opinion; we just get told to plant…we are given small 
money to plant trees that the government cut down and destroyed in the first place!”  
(Female interviewee, Dong Rui, July 2012) 
Households suggested that opinions and concerns expressed through formal channels are largely 
ignored, and those speaking out could even face retribution from local authorities and further 
marginalisation for doing so: 
“There is nobody we can turn to in order to raise concerns. Nothing ever changes and your 
life will be made much more difficult for speaking out. The Unions, the village committee, 
and the commune are all family or friends with each other” (Female interviewee, Da Loc, 
August 2012) 
A project by one particular INGO did request feedback from residents, and the information gained 
was crucial to the success of the project: 
“…we told (the INGO) about the barnacles on the young trees. They take nutrients from 
the trees and are too heavy for the branches and make them snap, so (the INGO) pays us to 
scrape the barnacles off the young trees now.” (Male interviewee, Da Loc, August 2012) 
Nevertheless, 
“(the INGO) does try to understand the local people, but it is difficult for them because 
people are afraid to speak out…Any problems with the mangroves are due to the local 
government, not (the INGO). I am worried that when (the INGO) leave the mangroves will 
disappear again.” (Male interviewee, Da Loc, August 2012) 
Instances of collective action occurred in all three communities to challenge local authorities on 
matters related to mangrove land allocation and financial matters. These actions and decisions were 
made between households based on the yin principle. These were met with varying degrees of success, 
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with one outcome being that the community in Dong Rui forced the local chairman to resign. As local 
officials were unresponsive to residents’ demands, the community circumvented the formal meso level 
of state authority, taking their concerns, at great expense and jeopardy, straight to the national 
government in Hanoi. 
However, households stated that the chairman was replaced with a representative who exhibited 
similar behaviour to his predecessor, by which time the community were too tired to protest again.  
With little avenue for recourse, such as alternative political parties, an open media, or thriving civil 
society, households expressed how they have become disillusioned and detached from political issues. 
This lack of public participation has been facilitated by top-down and non-participatory governance 
structures. Subsequently, substantial constraints are placed on household capabilities to influence 
decision making processes, and thereby modify or improve their entitlements in the light of challenges 
emanating from political and economic reform. 
4. Discussion 
This section considers the implications of actions taken at macro and meso levels of governance 
(objectives 1 and 2) for household (micro level) entitlements to MSPG (objective 3). The institutional 
challenges are discussed in relation to the effects of transition on: endowments (i.e., social, human, 
financial, physical and natural capital) and the ability to bundle these into entitlements; and the 
capability to participate in mangrove system governance and shape MSPG entitlements. 
4.1. Endowments and Entitlements 
Endowments of social capital allow certain households to access and mobilise other types of 
endowment (i.e., human, financial, physical and natural) in order to increase their environmental 
entitlements. Results show that political and economic reforms implemented within weak formal 
institutional settings create the opportunity for elite capture, as local authorities reinterpret national 
regulations and policies to their advantage and distribute the benefits among their networks. This is in 
line with findings from Vietnam’s central highlands, where broader political and economic processes 
in tandem with local power relations resulted in elite capture, limiting the access of marginalised 
groups to the resources and benefits emanating from devolution [48]. Such occurrences reflect the 
downside of social capital noted by Adhikari [92], whereby hierarchical social structures make upward 
enforcement of rules impractical, resulting in networks of powerful groups acting with impunity. 
Further, results illustrate how economic reforms have granted some households access to market 
oriented social networks external to the community in order to take advantage of lucrative aquaculture 
opportunities. This is consistent with findings from Ahmed et al.’s [93] study of tea agroforests in the 
Akha highlands of Southwest China. In their study, powerful local actors were able to forge new social 
networks external to the community in order to take advantage of price premiums through niche 
market networks, options that were not available to actors who had been disempowered by the 
introduction of market forces. These findings suggest that as reforms reorient governance structures 
and processes towards market forces, elite capture and the increasing influence of market networks 
external to the community risk undermining the creation of social institutions that foster the power 
sharing and trust necessary to support sustainability [94]. 
Resources 2015, 4 927 
 
 
Endowments of human capital can be fostered by engagement with market orientated social 
networks external to the community. Results indicate that those with access to such networks were 
able to access the necessary skills and knowledge (e.g., economic, technical) to establish successful 
aquaculture farms, and typically formed new community networks with other successful households in 
order to share information to advance their success. This is consistent with substantial evidence in the 
literature suggesting that social capital can be used as a mechanism to build and use aspects of human 
capital [95–97]. Results are also consistent with those of King [98], who notes that actors which are 
successful in furthering their goals will actively seek ties with similar others and share information in 
order to continue the pursuit of their goals. Marginalised households lacking access to human capital 
share information on local environmental conditions necessary for MSPG. This is consistent with 
research suggesting that deficits in human capital can be compensated by building social capital in 
order to share information more frequently and with greater number of others in order to support 
livelihoods [95]. Taken together our results add further support to the well-established relationship 
between human and social capital [99], while contributing to our knowledge of how this relationship 
shapes environmental entitlements through the ability to gain human capital through social capital. 
Endowments of financial capital shape the distribution of resources within communities which 
affects environmental entitlements. Results indicate that the increasing influence of market forces 
meant that households with to access financial capital were able to mobilise their social and human 
capital to develop aquaculture farms, further increasing their financial capital. Other research shows 
that even when endowments are relatively equal, entitlements to ecosystem services are highly 
differentiated within communities depending on household human and financial capital [48]. Adger et 
al. [100] found that subsequent inequalities in wealth result in the concentration of resources among a 
small number of households, whilst marginalised households lose access to significant livelihood 
resources and opportunities and become increasingly dependent on natural resources. Hence, ecosystem 
provisioning goods provide an important mechanism for reducing income inequality [101] as their 
collection is free and requires little capital outlay [102]. However, when economic growth is given 
priority over social and environmental goals, market forces can place natural resources under increased 
pressure [103], as was observed with the rapid development of aquaculture. Market incentives 
prompted local governments to explicitly encourage aquaculture and the clearing of mangrove forests, 
placing greater pressure on wetland ecosystem services [67]. Therefore, even with increased wealth 
from a rapidly growing aquaculture sector, foraging activities still persist among poor households, and 
market incentives encourage households to increase pressure on reduced mangrove system commons. 
This further degrades the significantly reduced mangrove system commons, reducing the 
environmental entitlements of more marginalised households. 
Financial capital enables some households to increase their endowments of physical capital, often at 
the expense of more marginalised households. Results show how households that have been successful 
in aquaculture utilise market forces to consolidate their position via the acquisition of cheap physical 
assets from unsuccessful households, who often face mounting debts from loans required for the 
capital outlay to start up aquaculture. Physical capital assets, such as wells and livestock, not only 
directly provide these households with access to water and food but also create flows that increase 
stocks of other types of capital (e.g., financial capital) [104]. Several studies highlight the complexity 
of a household’s decision to sell physical assets in response to shock, which considers not only the 
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short-term economic value, but also risk perception and the opportunity cost of the sale in the short and 
long term [105]. Contextual factors such as household wealth, shaped by access to skills, knowledge, 
networks and markets, influenced the decisions and market strategies that were available to 
households, corresponding with Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux [106]. Whilst better-off households 
had the assets to use markets as a profitable livelihood strategy, market engagement among poorer 
households typically reflects subsistence needs and a last resort response to distress [107]. Results here 
are concur with the sequential stages of market engagement outlined by Sherman and Ford [108], 
whereby: market transactions initially attempt to expand and secure future livelihood capacity; distress 
forces households to sell physical assets under unfavourable market conditions and at low prices in 
order to survive. Such actions can seriously impair environmental entitlements of marginalised 
households through reduced endowments of physical capital, negatively impacting future livelihood 
and household well-being [43]. 
Endowments of natural capital have been reduced for marginalised households as a result of the 
formalisation of private tenure rights. Results show that households with high dependency on MSPG 
face reduced access to mangrove system commons due to conversion to private aquaculture farms. The 
government has essentially decentralized responsibility for forests, not from the State to households,  
but to various lower level State entities [109]. Furthermore, restrictions to natural capital through 
private tenure systems reduce the access of dependent households to the ecosystem services necessary 
to support their livelihoods [110]. Research indicates the link between poverty and low levels of natural 
capital [111] which can offer a way out of poverty for marginalised households, but only when used 
effectively in conjunction with social, human, financial and physical assets [112]. The devolution of 
forest-use rights has not been comprehensive and far-reaching enough, which can result in the same 
institutional problems associated with centralised state ownership and additional misallocation of land 
to privileged actors [73]. In some places local conflicts occurred among coastal villagers over the 
allocation of land for aquaculture [67]. This caused livelihood insecurity, which can reduce household 
motivations for sustainable mangrove system management [73]. This has contributed to inequities 
between rich and poor and enhanced the difficulty in achieving cooperation among communities [73]. 
The continued reliance of these households on natural capital emanating from a significantly reduced 
commons reflects ongoing hardship, and may contribute to over exploitation and degradation of the 
natural resource base [113]. This was particularly true for female headed households, with results that 
are consistent with Mwangi and Dohrn [114] whereby informal patriarchal customary norms 
undermine formal recognition for women to acquire land. Furthermore, subsequent to formalisation of 
private tenure rights the remaining mangrove commons have become de facto open access and it is 
almost impossible for women and communities to defend their endowments against outsiders and local 
governments, who often appropriate land in the name of national interest and development [67]. 
4.2. Capabilities 
The lack of meaningful participation of MSPG users in formal institutions reduces their capability 
to negotiate and influence the processes and structures that shape MSPG entitlements. Such findings 
contradict the national obligations to the UNCBD (i.e., governance, participation, and equity and  
benefit sharing). Results indicate a lack of polycentric and multi-level characteristics, with the current 
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institutional arrangements limiting household capabilities and implications for the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of mangrove system governance. Governance emphasises shared responsibility and 
partnerships of diverse actors from different levels, and requires effective participation from all 
stakeholders [115]. It was observed that transition processes had essentially decentralized 
responsibility for forests, not from the State to households, but to various lower level State entities [109]. 
Subsequently, public involvement in mangrove system governance was typically conducted through 
authorised state channels, such as commune authorities and Mass Organisations. Such arrangements 
have been shown to result in technocratic, expert-driven and non-transparent governance processes [116]. 
The lack of effective participation of all stakeholders, particularly the most marginalised, limits the 
development and capability of all actors to contribute to the eventual emergence of collaborative 
governance [94]. Subsequently, Vietnam’s transition has lacked the norms of accountability and local 
participation in management decisions. The literature suggests that for decentralisation to work, 
democratically operational local governments and institutional constraints are necessary in order for 
authority figures to be accountable for their decisions [117,118]. Without this, communities lack the 
capability to exert pressure on local authorities deemed to be violating management rules or 
misappropriating resources [119]. 
The enduring top-down institutional structures and processes of the state limit the opportunity for 
collaborative governance and the capabilities of MRDC. A legacy of central planning, involving 
stringent targets for government bodies often lacking the capacity to exercise effective management,  
was found to result in government agencies often unwilling to work with local users, particularly if 
there is no prior practice of shared decision making. This has implications in terms of the distribution 
of revenues derived from mangrove systems as communities are not legal entities under Vietnamese 
law and so cannot enter into legally binding contracts [120]. Such observations are inconsistent with 
collaborative governance, which emphasises partnerships between state and non-state actors to foster 
capacity and institution building at all levels of governance [94]. Effective participation can enhance 
the capability of all stakeholders to shape collaborative governance towards a common goal [26]. 
However, results show low levels of citizen participation in mangrove system governance. Research 
indicates that in developing countries in transition, with low levels of participation, civil society plays 
a potentially crucial role in facilitating and institutionalising participation in environmental  
governance [121]. However, scant formal or informal recognition of communities in natural resource 
management, and the limited advocacy role of NGOs, mean that efforts to rehabilitate and restore 
mangrove system areas risk reinforcing the enduring legacy of top-down planning, as has been found 
elsewhere [122]. The lack of specific relevant policies and operational mechanisms for equitable 
sharing of benefits from biodiversity resources is hindering promotion of large-scale community 
participation in sustainable mangrove system governance. Therefore, it is crucial that emerging civil 
society institutions are inclusive and responsive to micro level actors, while linking the interests of 
these actors to higher levels of decision-making. 
Current mangrove system governance also risks reinforcing pre-existing power structures. Due to 
the one-party political context operating in Vietnam, along with low recognition of civil society and 
negligible levels of press freedom, concerned citizens have limited alternative avenues to appeal 
against the decisions of the state. Results indicate that transition processes have resulted in  
a concentration of power and wealth at the meso level, limiting the capability of MRDC to shape 
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mangrove system governance. The subsequent lack of accountable and transparent dialogues and 
mechanisms for active participation in the development of institutions limits collaborative governance, 
requiring some degree of power and responsibility sharing in decision making between the State and 
resource users [94]. The observed lack of participation can undermine levels of trust within localities, 
which is an essential part of collaborative governance [94] that facilitates the capability of MRDC to 
influence and shape common goals [123]. Recognising the constraints posed by local power structures 
that limit the capability of MRDC to participate in mangrove system governance, accountable and 
transparent institutions should be developed to increase the capabilities of all stakeholders and actors 
to be actively involved in the development, evaluation and monitoring of governance processes. 
Bridging actors or organizations are necessary to be available as active facilitators of these processes 
and mechanisms. Hence, it is crucial that emerging civil society institutions, particularly those 
developing between the State and NGOs, are inclusive and responsive to micro level actors, while 
linking the interests of these actors to higher levels of decision-making. Such institutional processes 
and structures are necessary for the sustainable governance of mangrove systems. 
5. Conclusions 
By analysing multiple levels of mangrove SES governance, findings demonstrate the importance of 
considering how these interacting elements have shaped environments entitlements. By using a 
framework that provides insights into the ability of households to gain legitimate access to MSPG,  
this study shows how State, private sector and NGO actors operating at the macro and meso levels 
have shaped mangrove system entitlements at the micro level (i.e., households). Whilst calls for multi-level 
governance of SES are welcomed, it must be acknowledged that such an approach is not conducive to 
the Vietnamese situation. 
Employing the adapted environmental entitlements framework has provided insights into how 
transition processes have altered mangrove SES governance and shaped local access to mangrove 
system resources. The devolution of land management from central government to households, 
decentralisation in land allocation authority from central to local government, and market 
liberalisation, have been implemented within a weak formal institutional framework, creating the 
opportunity for local authorities to re-interpret reforms and regulations to their advantage. 
Furthermore, the lack of clear regulation on mangrove system land results in a bias towards the 
informal institutional context that favours patriarchy, hierarchy and detachment relating to public 
affairs, resulting in concentration of power and wealth at the meso level (i.e., local). Subsequently, 
mangrove system land has been appropriated by households with access to finance, labour, skills, 
networks and markets in order to develop successful aquaculture farms. Findings demonstrate how the 
entitlements of marginalised households have been negatively impacted through: (1) reduced mangrove 
system endowments due to the reduction and degradation of mangrove system commons; (2) entitlement 
failure through social, political and economic processes that have institutionalised limitations on the 
opportunities and rights of marginalised households to access mangrove systems; and (3) reduced 
capabilities of MRDC to influence and shape the institutions of mangrove system governance. 
Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge the impact of rapidly growing aquaculture on environmental 
entitlements if policies to sustainably manage mangrove systems are to be successful. In particular, the 
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institutional structures and processes within and between various levels of mangrove SES governance 
that shape opportunities and rights to mangrove systems for the most marginalised. Results demonstrate 
that the Vietnamese experience may not be conducive to multi-level governance of mangrove SES, and 
further research is required to identify the specific institutions to achieve this. However, policies that 
provide all stakeholders with the capability to influence the political aspects of mangrove SES 
governance, support institutions which foster accountability in governance processes and offer 
alterative avenues of recourse, encourage civil society and the opportunity and ability to participate in 
decision making processes, are all useful starting points for improving environmental entitlements. 
Findings presented here shed light on theoretical concepts that go beyond the specific cases, 
highlighting important features of institutional structures and processes that should be considered 
within environmental governance more widely. For example, transition policies implemented within 
weak institutional settings can result in the concentration of power and wealth among elites at the meso 
level, creating a significant barrier to multi-level governance with negative impacts on the 
environmental entitlements of more marginalised actors. This has implications for mangrove system 
governance and the institutional processes that shape the equitable distribution of natural resources. 
How mangrove SES change affects household entitlements to mangrove system goods depends on 
institutional structures and process that occur between and among multiple levels of mangrove SES 
governance, and will manifest differently depending on the level of accountability, transparency and 
participation in decision making processes. 
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